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Models in Social Science:                            
A Review of Law and Public Policy:                
A Socioeconomic Approach                                  
by Lynne L. Dallas 
KENNETH G. DAU-SCHMIDT* 
Academics do not discuss the purpose of social science modeling enough.  
The purpose is not to reaffirm or sanctify a certain set of assumptions or 
preconceptions about the world.  Social science models are not a religion 
or even “the truth”; they are merely a tool by which we hope to extend 
our understanding and predictive powers over certain problems and 
perhaps derive a solution.  At its heart, the purpose of social science 
modeling is to clarify people’s understanding of a social problem.1 
Simplicity is a virtue in modeling, even though it is not the ultimate 
objective.  All modeling is necessarily an abstraction from reality that 
allows us to gain greater insight into a problem by focusing our attention 
on the variables that are of most importance to the phenomenon.  
However,  models can be too simple.  In determining whether a model is 
simple enough or too simple, the ultimate arbiter is whether the model 
increases our understanding of the phenomenon without missing some 
essential feature of the problem.  The art of social science modeling is in 
discerning which simplifying assumptions one can make to clarify an 
 
 *  Willard and Margaret Carr Professor of Labor and Employment Law, Indiana University, Bloomington; J.D., University of Michigan, 1981; Ph.D. (Economics), University of Michigan, 1984.   1. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Relaxing Traditional Economic Assumptions and 
Values: Toward a New Multidisciplinary Discourse on Law, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV. 181 184 (1991). 
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examined problem, but still preserve its essential features.2 
In social science modeling, perhaps no set of assumptions has received 
more attention, or more work, than the neoclassical economic model.  
For the greater part of the last century, economists have focused almost 
exclusively, and sometimes with almost religious fervor, on applying the 
criteria of Pareto optimality and wealth maximization to analyses based 
on the neoclassical assumptions of individual rational maximization, 
exogenous preferences, zero transaction costs, and perfect information.3  
Economists have focused on the neoclassical model because it is simple, 
producing mathematically tractable formula, and because it has 
produced some very useful insights into a wide variety of market 
phenomena.  The Pareto optimality and wealth maximization criteria 
have been used because they avoid the knotty issue of distributional 
fairness, an issue on which economists feel they have little to contribute.  
If you want a model to understand the changes in the price of peanuts, 
and you are not too concerned about who gets to eat the peanuts or 
whether the production of peanuts is morally sound, you cannot do much 
better than the traditional neoclassical model of supply and demand 
evaluated under the Pareto optimality and wealth maximization criteria. 
However, the neoclassical economic model and its associated 
evaluative criteria have been applied well beyond simple explanations 
and evaluations of the price of peanuts.  Gary Becker has applied them 
to education, the family, discrimination, and crime.4  Richard Posner has 
applied them to almost every conceivable legal problem from antitrust to 
his infamous treatment of the problem of adoption.5  These applications 
are not ill-intended or evil.  Indeed, they have yielded many useful 
insights into the examined problems.  Nevertheless, it is quite natural, 
and indeed our duty as social scientists, to ask whether the application of 
the simple neoclassical model adequately captures the essence of all of 
the examined problems, or whether a new economic analysis with 
different assumptions based in part on work from other disciplines such 
as sociology and cognitive psychology would yield a superior analysis 
of at least some of these phenomena.  Moreover, if the analysis is going 
to be used as a normative evaluation of what the law should be in order 
 
 2. Id.   3. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Economics and Sociology: The Prospects for an 
Interdisciplinary Discourse on Law, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 389, 395–97.   4. See generally GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL (2d ed. 1975); GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1976); GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971); Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: 
An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968).   5. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976); RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 155–56 (6th ed. 2003). 
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to make public policy more “efficient” or to maximize wealth, as such 
analyses inevitably are, then it is incumbent on us as social scientists to 
ask whether the criteria of Pareto optimality and wealth maximization 
adequately capture all of the relevant moral questions in the examined 
problem, or whether there are additional values to be considered in 
making public policy. 
These are the important questions Professor Lynne Dallas asks, and 
answers, in her important new book Law and Public Policy: A 
Socioeconomic Approach.6  In this book Professor Dallas uses edited 
excerpts of articles and original connective explanatory text to present 
the neoclassical economic model, the socioeconomic critique, and 
proposals for new models and evaluative criteria that draw on insights 
from other disciplines and perspectives such as sociology, cognitive 
psychology, philosophy, and feminist economics. The book presents 
general discussions of “law and socioeconomics,” “law and cognitive 
psychology,” “economic fairness and well-being,” “legal socialization 
and norms,” and “cooperation and the law.”  It also presents extensive 
examination of the application of these basic principles to the particular 
problems of discrimination, adoption, surrogate motherhood, family law, 
corporate law, and international law.  The book is intended as the 
primary resource for a class or seminar on law and socioeconomics, or as 
a supplementary text for courses on law and economics, discrimination law, 
family law, corporate law, or international law. 
Given the fundamental nature of Dallas’s work, it is not surprising that 
she examines some very interesting and important issues during the course 
of her presentation.  In Chapters Two and Four, she examines the context 
of individual behavior, contrasting the neoclassical model’s assumption 
of individual rational self-interest with the work of Geoffrey Hodgson7 
to account for non-self-interested decisions and group dynamics by 
placing economic decisionmaking in a social and political context.  
Professor Dallas also gives a full exposition of the “new school” of law 
and behavioral economics espoused by Russell Korobkin and Thomas 
Ulen,8 including explanations and examples of the “contextual” 
 
 6. LYNNE L. DALLAS, LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY: A SOCIOECONOMIC APPROACH (forthcoming 2004).   7. GEOFFREY M. HODGSON, ECONOMICS AND INSTITUTIONS: A MANIFESTO FOR A MODERN INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS  (1987).   8. See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: 
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051 (2000); see also Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 
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phenomena of “framing effects,” “endowment effects,” “anchoring,” and 
“preference reversals.”  In Chapters Four, Five, and Nine, Professor 
Dallas explores the process of socialization, and the role of norms and 
the law in that process, by comparing the neoclassical model’s 
assumption of exogenous preferences with the work of John Stolte,9 
Ellen Cohen, Susan White,10 and even myself,11 examining the 
endogenous relationship in which people’s preferences are shaped by 
other people and the law, and in turn how they have an impact on the 
rules governing society.  Dallas’s interweaving of the psychology literature 
on development and the economic literature in this area goes beyond a 
mere text book exposition on the subject to constitute a novel 
contribution to the literature.  Finally, in Chapters Three and Four, Professor 
Dallas directly addresses the issue of “fairness” in distribution and 
procedure, examining the conclusions of the traditional economic model 
of individual rationality and the criteria of Pareto optimality and wealth 
maximization in light of the empirical work of Daniel Kahneman, Jack 
Knitsch, Richard Thaler, and others,12 suggesting that perceived fairness 
has a very real impact on the actions of people.  The express consideration 
of these important topics in a text on the economic analysis of law is 
both useful and refreshing.13 
Professor Dallas’s book seems a timely contribution to a larger movement 
towards a multidisciplinary discourse on the law.  Interdisciplinary exchanges 
can be very valuable, but need the right overlap of examined questions 
and methodology between the disciplines to occur and be profitable.14  
Although pure transplants of methodology from one discipline to 
another have occurred and have been useful,15 it is much more likely that 
scholars will see the implications of work from other disciplines for their 
 
STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998).   9. John F. Stolte, Internalization: A Bargaining Network Approach, 8 J. THEORY SOC. BEHAV. 297 (1978).   10. ELLEN S. COHN & SUSAN O. WHITE, LEGAL SOCIALIZATION: A STUDY OF NORMS AND RULES (1990).   11. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, The Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a 
Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1.   12. Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: 
Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 728 (1985); see also TOM R. TYLER ET 
AL., SOCIAL JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY (1997).   13. Perhaps the only criticism of Dallas’s work I would make is that it is so ambitious in the number of questions and issues it examines that some students may find it daunting.  However, this problem can be overcome by the faculty who decide to use this book through their careful selection among the many materials presented by Dallas and their direction of the students in their readings and class discussions.   14. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 3, at 405.   15. For example, consider the importation of deductive scientific method and math from the hard sciences to economics during the last century.  Id. 
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own work if they are examining the same or similar problems as scholars 
in the other discipline.  Accordingly, some overlap in examined questions 
and methodology is desirable in order to promote interdisciplinary 
discourse.  However, if there is too much overlap, then the multiple 
disciplinary perspectives become redundant and no new insights can be 
gained from the exchange.  An academic monoculture is a very poor 
environment in which to examine social problems, and is probably not 
even possible given the physically different ways in which people’s 
brains approach problems.16 
Although economics spent the better part of the twentieth century 
evolving in relative isolation from the other disciplines, in the 1960s 
there began a significant coalescence among the disciplines with respect 
to examined questions and methodology.  The work of Gary Becker and 
Richard Posner in applying the neoclassical model to subjects such as 
discrimination, the family, and the law,17 which were traditionally the 
province of other disciplines, opened the way for later generations of 
economists to examine these and other questions from a less rigid 
economic perspective, borrowing from the work of disciplines already 
examining these problems.  Similarly, some sociologists and political 
scientists have begun to consider the implications of rational choice 
theory borrowed from economics.18 
This coalescence in examined subject matter and methodology among 
the disciplines in the study of subjects such as the law has led to 
increased interest in multidisciplinary analysis.  In 1997, the Association 
of American Law Schools added a section on Law and Socioeconomics 
which has proven popular enough to successfully undertake full-day 
programs for the last seven years.  At the 2002 annual meeting of the 
American Law and Economics Association, Robert Ellickson, a scholar 
who has long mixed economic, sociological, and psychological concepts 
in his own scholarly work,19 not only presided as president of the 
association, but also delivered a presidential address that called for 
greater discourse among the disciplines in the study of law.20  Most 
   16. Jeffrey Wasserstrom, Why I Believe It’s Time to Devise New Ways of 
Categorising Modern Scholars, TIMES HIGHER EDUC. SUPPLEMENT (London), Aug. 15, 2003, at 14.   17. See supra notes 4–5.   18. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 3, at 404; see, e.g., JAMES S. COLEMAN, INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS AND COLLECTIVE ACTION (1986).  
 19. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational 
Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23 (1989).  
DAU-SCHMIDT.DOC 9/18/2019  1:53 PM 
 
446 
recently, at the 2003 annual meeting of the Law and Society Association, 
Lauren Edelman, a sociologist by training, gave a presidential address 
very similar to Ellickson’s in its enthusiasm for a multidisciplinary 
discourse on law and, in fact, focused at length on some of the issues of 
endogeneity among law, society, and individual preferences that are 
examined in Professor Dallas’s book.21  As a result, scholarship that 
looks at legal problems from a behavioral economics perspective or a 
socioeconomic perspective is flourishing. 
Of course, the academic mission is not only the production of new 
knowledge but also its dissemination.  It is incumbent on the academy, 
not only to familiarize themselves with work in this new multidisciplinary 
discourse, but also to convey the insights of this work to the next 
generation of lawyers through our teaching.  Professor Dallas’s book, 
Law and Public Policy: A Socioeconomic Approach, pulls together a 
wide array of this exciting new scholarship and is an excellent medium 
for introducing this work to the legal academy and the next generation of 
lawyers.  I highly recommend its consideration for  classes or seminars 
in law and economics or law and socioeconomics. 
 
 
 20. Robert C. Ellickson, The Market for Social Norms, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1 (2001).   21. Lauren Edelman, Rivers of Law and Contested Terrain: A Law and Society 
Approach to Economic Rationality, LAW & SOC’Y REV. (forthcoming 2004). 
